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1.  Setting the Issues 
Most Western Developed Countries (WDCs)
1 have low levels of fertility, in 
fact generally below replacement, an issue already raising concerns in the 1980s 
(Bourgeois-Pichat 1987; Preston 1987). The occurrence of low fertility is not, 
however, an entirely new phenomenon as some countries (eg New Zealand, NZ) 
fell marginally below replacement for one or two years during the 1930s 
depression. But it is its magnitude, intensity and duration that sets apart the 
present episode: “Never before in recorded history…has fertility been so low for 
whole societies as it is now in the industrialised world” (Davis 1987: 48).  
At the same time levels have converged across the WDCs: at the peak of the 
baby-boom (1955-60) over 17 WDCs, including the six English–speaking 
countries (ESCs)
 2, Total Fertility Rates (TFR)
3  varied across a range of 1.74 
births per woman (4.07 –2.23), if Japan is excluded, and 1.90 (4.07 – 2.08) if 
Japan is included. By 1990-95, this had dropped to only 0.79 (2.06 – 1.27). Thus 
any research looking at the causes and consequences of differences in fertility 
among low fertility countries starts with a major handicap – the relative lack of 
variance between groupings of low fertility countries. 
                                                 
1 Ireland and Iceland have until very recently been the exceptions, but around 2000 the United 
States again reached replacement. WDCs are defined for this paper as those OECD countries that 
are English-speaking, Nordic, German and Dutch speaking, and French, plus Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain, and Japan.  
2 In this paper, wherever data allow, the ESCs include Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, 
United Kingdom, United States. There is some question whether Ireland exactly fits this grouping 
(see text below), while Quebec’s Francophone population is clearly a non-Anglophone Canadian 
minority. But there are also Black and Hispanic minorities in the US, the indigenous Maori in NZ 
(15% of the total), large immigrant communities in NZ (12% of the total were Asian or Pacific 
Island at the 2001 census), large Asian and other immigrant groups in Australia and Canada; Asian, 
Afro-Caribbean and other immigrants in the UK; a heterogeneous range of non-European, and 
non-British origin European immigrants in the US, and small but important indigenous minorities 
in the US, Canada and Australia. In sum, these countries are not homogeneously “British”. What is 
common, however, is the dominance in their national life of similar socio-political and cultural 
traditions that often have a British   provenance from UK colonisation. 
3 Generally, two major sets of comparative data are used here: 1. Population data coming from the 
United Nations, Estimates and Projections, 2000 Revision are used for the following country 
groupings: Japan; Nordic: Denmark, Norway and Sweden; Continental: Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany and The Netherlands; Southern European: Italy and Spain; and ESCs: Australia, Canada, 
Ireland, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States of America.  2. Sample survey data for 
WDCs are drawn from the Standard Country Reports of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe’s (ECE, which includes North America)/ Family and Fertility Study 
(ECE/FFS). New Zealand was accorded associate status for the ECE/FFS and thus data on it are 
included here; recent comparable Australian data are not available. Unfortunately, the United 
Kingdom chose not to join the study, while the United States’ Standard Country Report had not 
been published at the time of writing.   
2 
Nevertheless, among the WDCs, the fertility of the ESCs stands out as having  
“distinctive features”, to cite Chandola, Coleman and Hiorns. In their study 
“evidence seems to exist for [the] proposition” that ESCs have “elements of a 
common  fertility pattern…, especially in respect of the age-profile of fertility” 
(2002: 196). In 1990-95, the average (TFR) for 17 WDCs, including the six ESCs, 
was 1.70 births per woman, whereas for the ESCs alone the average TFR was 
1.91. Moreover, age-specific patterns are also different. Here Chandola et al’s 
summary is a very useful starting point for the present analysis. They argue that in 
the ESCs  
“age-specific fertility patterns display a marked ‘bulge’ in women under 
age 25  
… [this heterogeneity is] related to differences in the timing of births by 
marital  
status, and its magnitude is related to the proportion of births outside 
marriage. Additionally there is some evidence that, in the US, and to a 
lesser degree N Z, this heterogeneity in fertility patterns may be explained 
by ethnic differences [between European-origin and ethnic minority] in the 
timing and number of births” (Chandola, Coleman and Hiorns, 2002:181).  
This paper investigates what are the factors that may be linked to this 
“distinctive” fertility pattern. Its focus is on the equally “distinctive” policy 
context of these fertility patterns. A review of the literature shows that in their 
public policy environments the ESCs are indeed somewhat different from other 
WDCs. Yet in this very difference there is a paradox that this paper must address: 
the differences in policy relate exactly to those factors that, in theory, should lead 
to lower fertility, not to the relatively higher levels of ESCs noted earlier.  
If the policy-fertility link seems counterfactual, as has just been suggested, then 
there may be other possible, perhaps more nuanced, factors that might explain 
what is merely the “relative” reproductive advantage of the ESCs. The last part of 
the paper is more a reflection, in the French meaning of this word, than a 
sustained empirical analysis about what might be the key variables fashioning this 
subtle difference. We start, however, by looking at public policy. 
 
2.  Public Policy Environments, Family Policy and Fertility 
The so-called “worlds” constituting policy environments had been classified by 
Esping-Andersen (1990) as “ ‘social-democratic’ (basically the Nordic countries), 
‘conservative’ (Continental Europe), and ‘liberal’ (the Anglo-Saxon Nations)…” 
(cited in Esping-Andersen 1999:12). He argues that liberal policy is essentially  
“residual” in that “social guarantees are restricted to ‘bad risks’… it adheres to a 
narrow conception of what risks should be considered ‘social’ [and] its 
encouragement of the market… Besides univers-alism the social democratic 
welfare state is particularly committed to comprehensive risk coverage, generous 
benefit levels, and egalitarianism… The essence of a conservative regime lies in 
its blend of status segmentation and familialism” (Esping-Andersen 1999: Chapt 5 
passim). Myles (1996: 118) takes these points a bit further by comparing the 
residual “social assistance” model implemented “When Markets Fail”, to the 
“industrial achievement model” based around “labour market performance”, and  
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the “citizenship model” of “universal social benefits”. In his most recent book , 
moreover, Esping-Andersen has added in three different new models together 
constituting, as he puts it, what could be seen as a “fourth world”.  
Firstly, there is the “Antipodean” model (Australia and NZ) in which what 
seem modest, typically needs-tested, benefits are coupled, however, with 
“functionally equivalent welfare guarantees that were implanted in the labour 
market via the wage arbitration system”. NZ was to become a pioneer welfare 
state through its Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1894, and the 
underlying ideology of a “social wage” sufficient to sustain a working man and 
his family. These, and full employment in many years, were to underpin the 
maintenance of social equality until, it could be argued, the radical shift to an 
extreme liberal regime in the late 1980s-early 1990s (Shirley et al. 1997, esp. 
chapt 2).
4  
A second is the “Mediterranean” model, that perhaps differs from the 
“Continental European”. (Esping-Andersen debates this point, but it certainly 
seems to contrast with what is seen in the ESCs), by “the use of social 
benefits...for purposes of political clientelism” and its emphasis on “familialism”. 
For example, “In Italy, even in the industrialised north, the accepted meaning of 
family remains encompassing. It is a solidarity network consisting not only of a 
couple and their children, but also of grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins and 
even more distant relatives” (Chesnais 1996; 735).  
As the Mediterranean experience provides a counterpoint to that of the ESCs or 
Nordic countries, it is worth looking at it in a little more detail. Livi-Bacci and 
Salvini define the Italian model as “too much family and too few children”, citing 
as a key mechanism  
“Prolonged co-residence of young adults with their parents is a central 
aspect of the Italian situation; [it is] directly associated with the 
postponing of marriage and childbearing, and relatively low rate of 
nuptiality, and without doubt it counts among the principal causes of the 
growing gap between expected and achieved family size” (Livi-Bacci & 
Salvini 2000: 231-32; translation by present authors). 
But this has to seen in its context, so they argue: that social transfers for young 
adults fall below those in much of Europe. Yet from 18 to 60 years tax burdens 
are relatively high, whereas comparatively low percents of GDP are spent on 
education. Moreover, deposits for purchasing dwellings are high. Thus in a sense 
“Italian familialism” is not a return to the traditional parent-child household and 
moral values. Instead, it is a familialism that maximises the utility of the family as 
a sort of policy/service delivery instrument. Italy is not unique in this; Livi-Bacci 
and Salvini also identify this factor in Spain and Japan (2000:252). 
The third model is the “East Asian”, notably Japan, that in many senses is a 
hybrid. It depends on high levels of targeting, and is one in which the family still 
                                                 
4 See also Kamerman and Kahn 1997a, who give a very succint analysis of the similarities and 
differences in family changes and family policies in four of the ESCs; besides Shirley et al 1997 
on NZ, see also essays on Gt Britain by Ringen (ed) 1997, Canada by Baker and Phipps 1997, and 
the US Kamerman and Kahn 1997b.  
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plays a major role in family welfare, particularly in caring for the elderly (Esping-
Andersen 1999: 88-92)
5 
In their cross-comparative research on WDCs, Castles and Mitchell (1993: 117-
119) take this further. They analyse a range of political and public policy variables, 
from which they derive a set of propositions allowing them to classify nations into 
“families”. The ESCs stand apart as countries in which since World War II “the 
political right has enjoyed long periods of political office”, but vary between them 
as to the political strength of their labour movements, the level of public policy 
expenditures and their use of “equalising instruments”. Those ESCs low on two or 
three of these factors are Canada
6. and Ireland, while the United States (US) is 
low on all. They conclude that “the impression is of an extraordinarily close fit 
between political structure and the character of welfare provision… Three of the 
six [ESCs – Australia, New Zealand (NZ) and the United Kingdom (UK) -  have] 
an historical legacy of [Radical egalitarianism]. Two others have characteristics 
which cross-cut the Radical and Liberal worlds. The US alone is clearly an 
inhabitant of the Liberal world”(123-24). Elsewhere Castles (1998: 8-9) sets out 
what he calls “families of nations”, comprising the ESCs and others (Continental 
West European, composed of France and the German/Dutch speaking countries, 
with “a historical legacy of dynastic links, cultural (particularly religious) 
similarities and policy diffusion…”; Nordic; Southern European), while 
Switzerland and Japan
7 were difficult to classify. 
Four other points about the ESCs are worth noting. Firstly, Ireland has a 
somewhat different history. Like Australasia and North America it was a colony, 
but unlike them its path was not dominated by the British and other Europeans, 
“transplanted overseas”, but was one of  the “colonial inheritance” of a “subject 
people” colonised “to enhance military and political control and to exploit 
economic resources” (Castles 1993a: xxii). Ireland also did not join in the radical 
shifts in policy of the 1980s seen in other ESCs (Castles 1993b: 5).  
Secondly, despite their profile as “liberal” recent low social spending states that 
rely on targeting (Kamerman and Kahn 1997a:10), “the case for an English-
speaking family of nations united by a common ‘status’ of welfare state laggards 
sits very uneasily with the historical record… The New Zealand Social Security 
Act of 1938 was regarded by the ILO as having ‘more than any other law, 
determined the practical meaning of social security,…’ (Castles & Mitchell, 1993: 
93-94). Within the ESCs, the US is different in this regard in that some 
components of welfare programmes vary from state to state (eg maternity leave, 
Rosenfeld 1996: 205), and thus historically some have been highly innovative in 
diverse regions, but this may not show up at the national level. Some uniformity is 
achieved, as in the New Deal, by federal interventions to pressure or support 
individual states (Kamerman and Kahn 1997b: passim). In Canada, as already 
                                                 
5  John Campbell notes as a special case that he terms the Japan Model, “a full-employment policy 
powered by the private sector…” (cited in “The Japanese Model: Past Present and Future” Asahi 
Shimbun, 12-13 Oct 2002, p.25)  
6 In Canada’s case Federal-Provincial trade-offs produce more equitable policy than would 
otherwise be the case (Castles and Mitchell 1993: passim). 
7 See also footnote 5..  
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noted , federal-provincial trade-offs affect family policy formulation and 
implementation. 
Thirdly, Castles makes a point that is critical for this paper. The ESCs share  
“a link [that] can be traced to the timing of sequences of historical 
development that differentiate the experiences of the ESCs from other 
nations of advanced capitalism. The argument is simply that slow 
economic growth, policy ineffectiveness and high threshold electoral 
systems [in the 1970s and1980s] are all, in some degree, consequences of 
the relative earliness of economic, social and political modernisation in 
Britain and in the countries largely settled by British migration” (Castles 
1993b: 28). 
Fourthly, the ESCs have in common a “1980s shift to anti-statism” (Castles 
1993a: xviii). Under Reagan and Thatcher, liberal welfare policies were extended 
in the US and UK (Castles 1993b: 6-7), while in the Antipodes the supports of 
“social wage” and full employment virtually disappeared. These “guarantees” 
were eroded by the shift to “liberalism” in Australia in the 1980s. “[T]hey were 
effectively eliminated in NZ” (Esping-Andersen 1999: 89; see also Castles et al 
1996). What is surprising about the Antipodean changes was that they were 
initiated by Labour (Left-incumbency) governments, although then carried further, 
especially in New Zealand, by Right- incumbency cabinets. In Canada the 
changes came not so much from the restructuring of public policy – conservative 
governments attempted but did not succeed in this - but from restructuring its 
trade links with the US (Castles 1993b: 10-11) 
Much of the public policy literature deals with the family and with its interface 
with the labour market. Not surprisingly, a considerable degree of attention is paid 
to family formation and structures, and to levels of fertility per se (Castles 1999: 
Chapt 7; Esping-Andersen 1999: Chapt 4; Kamerman & Kahn eds 1997; Day 
1992: Chapt 5 looks at policy alternatives in low fertility societies; the official 
positions for all ECE countries, including Canada and the US, is in 
UN(ECE)/Council of Europe 1994).  
In the ESCs there is a focus in both policy research and in policy formulation in 
political circles on what might be seen as the non-traditional family forms: 
cohabitation, ex-nuptial childbearing and lone-parenting (Kamerman and Kahn 
1997a). Frequently, moreover, the contemporary situation is seen in an 
unfavourable light by comparison with some vaguely defined past ‘golden era’ of 
families (in the Neo-Europes, typically the baby-boom). Often these distinctly 
different behaviours are confounded in the public discourse, and in analyses. This 
eventuates in ‘moral panics’
8 about the future of the family, resulting often in 
prescriptive policy formulations and programmes (eg statements by Social 
                                                 
8 Ironically, NZ’s ‘golden era’, the baby boom, was subject to a Gilbertian moral panic about 
“moral delinquency…among children” that was “undermining the fabric of society”, requiring a 
Commission headed by a Queen’s Counsel, Dr Mazengarb (Belich 2001: 504), the report of which 
was sent to every household in the country. This was not by any means the first such panic. There 
were others in the late 1890s/early 1900s about declining fertility, in the Australasian colonies, 
resulting in a Royal Commission in New South Wales; and a Commission on purported high levels 
of abortion in NZ in the late 1930s.  
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Security Secretary Lilley in the UK, reported Daily Telegraph, Mar 31 1995; for 
the US, Newt Gingrich’s and Dick Armery’s, and the “House Republicans’”, 
Contract with America; for NZ, memoires of Finance Minister Ruth Richardson, 
1995: 213-14; for Canada, see Baker and Phipps 1997:184). These anxieties and 
responses seem more extreme in Anglo-Saxon than in continental European 
countries, and detract attention from more normative family problems and more 
universalistic family policies relating, say, to poverty and the supports for child-
rearing by families. “The fiscal malaise of [ESCs], and thus calls to demolish the 
welfare state, is often attributed to family dysfunction, and particularly to the sole-
parent [also variously called lone/solo parent – the NZ term is used in this quote], 
which is usually female-headed” (Pool 1996: 12). 
The recent trend towards ageing and low fertility has, however, revived interest 
in factors that might lead to higher fertility. A macro-economic, cross-
comparative (Netherlands-NZ), time-series analysis by Poot and Siegers (2001: 
96) argues that fertility levels are influenced by economic factors. In the case of 
factors that might affect real costs of childbearing these causal links were, 
however, “fragile” and “suggested that the causality runs from fertility to real 
interest rates rather than vice-versa”. In contrast there were stronger effects 
coming from policy interventions, notably the “impact of social security payments 
on fertility… the introduction of a substantial subsidy to families just after World 
War II boosted fertility greatly…”  
A comprehensive review of a wide variety of family policies is found in 
Gauthier’s study (1996). For this present paper the interest in her work is on cash 
benefits to families and other sorts of interventions that might be seen to have pro-
natalist impacts, such as maternity leave. She summarises the effects of these in a 
figure (Gauthier 1996:189) that trichotomises support into high, medium and low 
categories. The ESCs, except for the UK, and the Southern European countries are 
in the low grouping. 
In her most recent paper Gauthier fits family policies into the Esping-Andersen 
country clusters. She shows that state support for parents has not converged in 
response to the fact that countries face some common problems, but had actually 
diverged. In this regard the liberal cluster, including all the ESCs except Ireland, 
plus Japan and Switzerland “has been increasingly marginalized” (Gauthier 
2002:467)  
In another paper Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) restrict their analysis to the 
linkages between benefits and fertility, for a period (1970-90) that post-dates the 
post-war decades when social security may have acted as a positive incentive (see 
above Poot and Siegers 2001). Gauthier and Hatzius’ results show that cash 
benefits did not affect fertility in the Anglo-Saxon countries, had a marked impact 
in the Scandinavian, and that the Continental and Southern European countries 
fell between, varying for the parity order of the child for whom the benefit was 
received. Where the value of the benefit also increases by birth-order this effect is 
maximised. They conclude, however, that  “The potential effects of benefits 
should also be investigated. These include means-tested benefits and benefits in 
the fields of day-care, housing, health care and education” (Gauthier and Hatzius 
1997: 302).   
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This introduction has served to highlight questions to be analysed in the rest of 
the paper. The ESCs have different fertility and policy regimes. Their focus on 
residual and targeted assistance means that today the ESCs fall not only behind 
some other groupings of WDCs, but that cash-incentives for fertility have minimal 
impact in these countries. Against this the ESCs have higher fertility than most 
other WDCs, and this is marked at youngest ages at which it could be assumed the 
need for supports and family-friendly policies would be greatest. This summary 
thus leaves a number of unresolved questions: 
1.  Are there other demographic factors that might explain this paradox? 
2.  Or are there “cultural” factors in the ESCs relating to values around child-
bearing, family formation and household structures? 
3.  Are there more muted aspects of the policy environment, or rather how the 
populace responds to it, that affect fertility trends and patterns? Indeed, as 
Gauthier and Hatzius remind us (see above), family friendly and potentially 
pro-natalist policies may relate to many aspects of well-being and not just 
comprise family benefits (see also Letablier 2002 reporting on France) 
 
3. Mapping the Fertility Transitions of ESCs 
Many aspects of the transitions followed by Western Developed Countries 
(WDCs) have been well documented in country or cross-comparative analyses (eg 
Henripin 1968; Festy 1979; Romaniuc 1984; Khawaja 1985; Sceats & Pool 1985; 
Bourgeois-Pichat 1987; Preston 1987; Rallu and Blum (eds) 1991, for European 
countries only; Nimwegen et al (eds) 1993, especially chapts by Beets, by Blayo 
et al, and by Beets et al; Morgan 1996; Pool et al 1999; Livi-Bacci & Salvini 
2000; ECE/FFS, various dates and authors; see also below References, 
Unpublished Data Sources). Thus conventional time-series analyses will not be 
presented here. Nevertheless, the Appendix provides Total Fertility Rates (TFRs) 
for selected WDCs.  
The groupings of countries used here in tables and figures vary between those 
that are based on the Economic Commission for Europe’s, Fertility and Family 
Surveys (ECE/FFS) and those used by Gauthier and Hatzius (1997). Available 
data from the ECE/FFS are classed following the groupings used by the National 
Institute of Population and Social Security, Tokyo. Those tables/figures that 
employ vital statistics use the classification followed by Gauthier and Hatzius 
1997. Within groups there are, of course, often also major differences, as ,for 
example, between France and Netherlands in the “Continental” group (van 
Nimwegen et al. 1993: 4-5). 
The low, sub-replacement, TFRs that characterise almost all the WDCs today 
come from two different factors. But before discussing these it is worth reiterating 
that the span of rates is not great today, although within that range the ESCs tend 
to be at the upper end, a long-standing distinction (See below). 
The first factor affecting the general pattern is that completed family sizes are 
now small, with decreasing proportions of women having two or more children, as 
is seen in Table 1. Conversely, this table also suggests that childless and one-child 
families are increasing in prevalence, although some caution should be applied 
when making this comment. There are significant differences in timing and levels  
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between European populations: within some nations there is a great deal of 
variance in the profiles of family sizes, yet in other countries this is far less true 
(de Rose & Racioppi 2001: 28-29). Table 2, column (1) uses life-table estimates 
of the probability of having one or more child(ren) by age 30 years, for women of 
all educational statuses (differences by educational attainment will be discussed 
later). In every country there is a decrease in this likelihood, and thus conversely 
increases in childlessness at least until age 30, although this change is as yet very 
slight in the case of Portugal. The ESCs, if anything, are a little less advanced in 
this direction than some European countries. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
A second factor, also demonstrated by Table 2, is that of a major shift in timing. 
Again some caution must be expressed, because, for countries with longer 
traditions of low fertility, a shift to delayed first childbearing may not imply 
further decreases in levels of childless and one-child families, although it will 
affect parities 2+ (Toulemon and Mazuy 2001: 624-25). This is a very important 
point raising major issues not only about timing per se, but also about what we 
will call the “force” of reproduction across the reproductive span. That is, whether 
child-bearing occurs disproportionately at younger ages (15-24 yrs), in the middle 
part of the span (25-34), or at the end (35+), as measured by the proportion of the 
TFR found at these ages, or by a ‘TFR-type’ rate computed across these narrow 
bands of ages.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Data on the Force of  Early Reproduction are presented in Table 3. There is a 
very wide spread in this pattern, 15 percentage points from 16% (Japan) to 31% 
(ESCs). What is very clear in this table is the higher level of the ESCs, the 
“bulge” identified by Chandola et al (2002), compared to other groupings, 
although Austria within the Continental block is also very high, whereas Australia 
in the ESC category is relatively low. Australia and New Zealand’s majority 
Pakeha (European-origin) populations had a very long tradition of Antipodean 
solidarity demographically, lasting from the 19
th century, but the two different 
migration flows in the post-War period have produced a divergence, with 
Australia affected, in particular, by inflows from Southern Europe (Pool 2002). 
Also of interest are the very low levels seen in the Netherlands, Japan, Denmark 
and the Mediterranean countries. The Netherlands with its recent history of higher 
fertility is a very interesting case -- today its TFR has dropped to 1.5 (van 
Nimwegen et al 1993: 4-6),  perhaps setting a precedent for the ESCs. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Chandola et al. (2002) have pointed to the effects of the fertility levels of ethnic 
minorities on overall patterns of reproduction. Certainly, the Force of Early 
Reproduction is very high for both the Maori (48%) and African-American (54%)  
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minorities, by comparison with the majority populations in these countries, 
Pakeha in NZ (26%) and ‘White’ Americans (39%). Yet the overall impact of 
these minorities’ reproductive regimes is limited. The rate for the Total 
populations are only 13% above that for Pakeha in NZ, and 5% above the ‘White’ 
rate in the US: In the demography of the ESCs, ‘White’ Americans tower above 
all European-origin populations, but their numbers do include Hispanics, who 
have higher fertility. That said, the ‘Pakeha’ grouping also includes the Pacific 
Island Polynesian population, which has significantly higher fertility than that of 
other New Zealanders. 
In terms of the force of reproduction at the older ages (35+) the ESCs on 
average have lower rates than the other WDC groupings, but the differences and 
spread, only four percentage points between groupings, are far less marked than 
for early reproduction. The percentages are:  
   ESCs      14%      Continental   16% 
   Japan    13%      Nordic    16% 
   Southern  European  17% 
What again sets the ESCs apart, however, is the relatively weak force of 
reproduction at the middle age-group, 25-34 years. Australia is the sole example 
that resembles other groupings, being closest to Germany. As noted already, the 
patterns of reproductive intensity in the former may have been modified by 
Southern European immigration. In the case of the latter, the lowest force at 
middle reproductive ages outside the ESCs
9, may have been affected, as will be 
implied from data to be presented below, by the incorporation of East Germany 
into the Federal Republic
10.  
The net result of these different patterns of force is shown in Figure 1, which 
graphs the percentage point deviations from the WDC level for each reproductive 
stage. In Figure 2 this is shown schematically. The ESCs stand out as having a 
very marked U-shaped distribution, while the other groupings have either inverse 
U-shaped distributions, shallow for the Nordic and Continental countries, whose 
patterns are very similar, but more marked, for Japan, or closer to a modified S-
shape for the Southern European countries. The ESCs, relative to the other WDCs, 
thus have two polar loci of reproduction, with the central part rather weaker. In 
policy terms this is of enormous significance: it is not just that, relative to the 
other WDCs, the ESCs have concentrated their reproduction at young ages, but 
that they also have a degree of concentration at the older ages. It is around this 
bifurcation that much of the ‘moral panic’ and political concerns revolve, a point 
that will be returned to below.  
 
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
 
There is yet another aspect to this: as is true across the WDCs, fertility at older 
ages is going up. By approximately 2000, the ESCs had on average an age-
                                                 
9 Austria may well have resembled the ESCs, but there were no data available to assess this. 
10 See also Konietzka & Kreyenfeld (2002:344). They show, for 1997, marked differences in force 
with a peak in the present day eastern regions of Germany at 20-28 for women with a child aged 3-
6 years, as against 29-36 in the western part.   
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specific fertility rate (ASFR) of 102 per 1000 at 30-34 years, up from 88 in 1985
11. 
The remaining WDCs for which there are data were only marginally higher at 103, 
up from 79 in 1985. At 35-39 years the ASFR in 1985 for the ESCs had been 33; 
by 2000 it was 47. For the remaining WDCs the change was from 26 to 44. The 
highest ASFRs in the WDCs at 30-34 yrs in 2000 were in Australia, Ireland, New 
Zealand, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway; at 35-39 they were in the same 
countries, with Sweden replacing Denmark.  
Finally, one other factor of force should be noted: the shift-share in the middle 
age-range between 25-29 and 30-34 years. Countries that have recently gone 
through this shift, and which now see their highest rate in the latter age-group, are 
Australia, Ireland, Netherlands and Spain, with New Zealand and Japan right at 
the changeover point. This obviously has longer-term implications for policy. 
Shifts of this sort may be as much a factor of differences in rates of increases as of 
decreases at one age-group and an increase at the next.
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The higher fertility and patterns of force that distinguish the ESCs are not 
something new. They fit demographic regimes that have certainly existed since 
the baby-boom, and might be seen as going back far further than this. In the 1870s 
the highest birthrates in Festy’s WDC data set (1979: 52), all above 37 per 1000, 
were recorded for Canada, American ‘Whites’ and for Australia, and for Germany 
and Finland outside the ESCs. England and Wales, at 35, was above a number of 
continental European countries, while Pakeha NZ rates (not included in Festy’s 
comparison) were even above the Australian, reaching 42 per 1000 in 1876 
(Khawaja 1985: 153). For the Neo-European ESCs, these rates came from 
nuptiality patterns of early and almost universal marriage (Sceats and Pool 1985: 
183)
13, that were markedly different from those occurring in the British Isles, 
often referred to popularly as “home”.  
It is the baby-boom, aspects of which are documented in Table 4, that sets aside 
the ESCs in the post-War period. We define a baby-boom in terms of two 
characteristics: higher TFRs, and a situation where the force of fertility is high at 
early ages. In New Zealand, the baby-boom saw these two characteristics 
determined by earlier timing and closer spacing than was the case for Canada 
(Sceats 1981). Short intervals are still a New Zealand norm that is, for example, 
more marked than even for the United States (Morgan et al 2001), and certainly 
by comparison with European countries (Sceats 1999). Finally, the higher average 
family sizes of the baby-boom were also driven in part by a shift away from 
childless or one-child marriages. Indeed, “[t]he proportion of  women having 
three or four children climbed from 31 per cent (for the 1912-16 birth cohorts) to 
43 per cent (for the 1930-31 birth cohorts)” (Khawaja 1985: 158).   
                                                 
11 Ireland was the sole country analysed here to show declines in ASFRs at 30-34 yrs (from 136 to 
126) and 35-39 (75 to 64). Sweden showed a decline in part of the period, but by 2000 was going 
up again. 
12 By 2002 this had occurred for New Zealand. While fertility at both 25-29 and 30-34 yrs declined, 
but the former trend was more marked, thus producing a shift-share. 
13 Pickens 1980, showed that these metropolitan-colonial differences occurred within families as 
well as between populations   
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In these senses, a baby-boom, properly speaking, is really a neo-European 
phenomenon, because the UK looks more like its continental European 
counterparts, and Ireland was following a totally different path from most of the 
other WDCs, a long term decline. On the continent, Austria meets the criterion of 
higher levels of force at younger ages, but not that of level. For the TFR, in 
contrast, the Netherlands certainly meets the criterion of level but does not 
experience elevated early force. On both these criteria it is perhaps Norway that 
comes closest to the neo-European ESCs, yet its TFR is still well below theirs. 
The decline after the boom was also more marked in the ESCs than in the 
remaining WDCs with the exception of the Netherlands, while among ESCs the 
UK has a lower decrease. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The post-boom “baby-bust” was followed around 1990 by what Pool has called 
a “baby-blip”, so as to distinguish it from the boom per se, but that in the 
American literature is referred to as the “echo to the baby-boom”. The American 
terminology describes its provenance – the intersection of two trends. These are 
(i) the ASFRs at 30+ years of cohorts that had delayed their births but who were 
having these at older ages, with (ii) the arrival of distended cohorts, the last of the 
baby boom generation births, at these older reproductive ages. In NZ, in terms of 
numbers, the baby-boom had bi-modal peaks, in 1960 and again in 1970, thereby 
prolonging the blip through much of the 1990s. 
To a limited extent the higher fertility of the ESCs has also been affected, as 
has been noted, by the presence of “minorities” with higher fertility and patterns 
of early childbearing. Table 5, using two of  the same variables as in Table 4, 
examines this factor in the late baby-boom and more recently for three neo-
European ESCs analysed by Chandola et al (2002) to look at the impacts of ethnic 
differences, plus for Germany, where there are marked divergences in patterns of 
fertility between the former divisions of East and West. These last differentials are 
due, of course, not to ethnicity but to a political schism and variations in the 
balance between Catholic and Protestant.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Despite the fact that, by comparison with their European-origin counterparts, 
African-Americans and Maori have markedly different levels of fertility and 
patterns of early childbearing, especially around 1970, the overall impact on Total 
population trends is negligible, just a point or so (for the Maori transition see Pool 
1991). At the end of the baby-boom these minority patterns were merely an 
exaggerated form of the majority’s force of reproduction, extremely so in the case 
of Maori in 1970. But by 1990, by the baby-blip, the early childbearing of the 
minority differed sharply from the pattern shown by the majority group, especially 
in New Zealand’s case. For Canada, the Quebec pattern depresses the Total, but it 
differs only marginally from that shown by the largest Anglophone Province 
(Ontario). Germany produces a somewhat different situation: TFRs are virtually  
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the same, yet the rhythm of reproduction is totally different. One other 
Continental country, Belgium, included in tables in this paper also has major 
cultural differences, in their case linguistic. Again these seem to have little overall 
impact on fertility levels: in 1990 the TFR for Flanders, the “majority” population 
comprising 58% of the Total, was 1.55 births per woman; that for the entire 
country 1.62 (ECE/FFS, Lodewijckx 1999: 54). 
Thus, today in low fertility countries ethnic and other divisions have limited 
impact on national trends. More importantly for this paper, there is strong 
empirical evidence of trends, implying the maintenance of cultural norms, even in 
majority populations, favouring high fertility and early childbearing in the ESCs, 
or at least in the Neo-Europes. To take the case of NZ (until recently it was 
reasonably representative of Anglo-America and Australia), the pioneer period 
was characterised by this pattern, which then shifted rapidly between 1876 and 
1901 to one closer to that of the UK – later marriage and higher levels of celibacy. 
In the baby-boom there was then a reprise of the pioneer model, at least of its age-
specific dimensions (the peak baby-boom TFR in 1961, 4.2, was still below that 
estimated for the 1870s, 6.7). This was followed in the baby-bust by a switch back 
to later marriage and childbearing, and lower fertility, almost exactly a century 
after the first shift between neo-European and European patterns had occurred 
(Jackson and Pool 1994: 17). Clearly, then, by comparison with other WDCs, the 
ESCs, at least the US and NZ, are capable of sudden and significant shifts in 
reproductive regimes. These changes produce the rather severely disordered 
cohort flows seen in these populations (Pool et al 1999; Pool 2000). 
 
4.  Determinants of Differences between ESCs and other WDCs  
A review of the proximate determinants conventionally referred to in fertility 
analyses throws little light on the questions that emerge from the results presented 
here. The prevalence of contraception is high across all WDCs. Typically it is 
used by the youngest cohorts even at first intercourse, although there is some 
variance between ethnic groups
14. In many WDCs, especially the ESCs, very high 
levels of pill use occur at the central reproductive ages for timing and spacing. 
Sterilisation is the norm in numerous WDCs for limitation among women and 
couples at older reproductive ages (ECE/FFS various dates and authors: Tables 19 
& 21; detailed for NZ in Pool et al 1999). With the exception of the U.S., in 
WDCs total abortion rates are low (<0.6/woman), and in the other ESCs are <0.5; 
in the 1980s New Zealand had one of the lowest rates but these have increased 
recently. Across the ESCs, abortion had been legalized in various ways in the 
1970s, usually after rancorous debate (eg NZ see Sceats, 1988; Sceats and Parr, 
1995). 
With the exception of Southern Europe, there are also not particularly 
significant differences between countries and cohorts in levels of union formation, 
although the form this might take varies considerably. Across the WDCs, and for 
all countries, high proportions of women have been in one or more unions by age 
25 years, as is shown in Table 6. But today this is not likely to be formal marriage, 
                                                 
14 In NZ age, cohort and period are the prime determinants of differentials, ethnicity is of some 
importance, while education and other co-variates have limited effect (Dharmalingam et al 1997)  
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except in Southern Europe. The switch to cohabitation as the preferred form of 
first union seems to have occurred simultaneously in WDCs in the 1970s. Levels 
vary, with France, the Nordic countries, New Zealand (Maori and Pakeha)  and 
Quebec among the populations at the higher end of the spectrum, and English-
speaking Canada rather lower (Klizjing & Macura  1997; Lapierre-Adamcyk et al 
1997; Pool et al 2000), but all the WDCs outside Southern Europe (and probably 
Japan) seem to have gone through the same general revolution in family forms. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
As noted earlier there are differences in the force of reproduction by age, yet 
across the WDCs, and especially the ESCs the early force has fallen, and with it 
teenage childbearing. This has co-varied in time with the shift to cohabitation and 
increases in levels of ex-nuptial childbearing. There is, however, a tendency on 
the part of some commentators to confound teenage childbearing with ex-nuptial 
childbearing, and both of these with sole-parenting 
15.  As this affects the policy 
debate it must be discussed further here. 
In the ESCs, especially the neo-Europes, the baby-boom was driven to a degree 
by teenage pregnancy, resulting from nuptial or ex-nuptial conception, with the 
latter typically followed first by a wedding, usually “white” and blessed by the 
families concerned, and then by a nuptial confinement with the birth often 
referred to as “premature”. This is illustrated by reference to NZ data in Table 7. 
If the accent is placed on ex-nuptial conception, as against ex-nuptial birth, it has 
been a significant factor at least since the late baby-boom. In fact, the seminal 
studies by the late E.G. Jacoby (1958 & 1961) show that this pattern was a long-
standing tradition in 20
th century Pakeha NZ, peaking just after World War I, 
again in the 1930s and reaching its apotheosis in the baby-boom (Pool & 
Crawford 1980). If marriage did not occur quickly, thereby resolving any moral 
dilemmas as  the opprobrium of ex-nuptial birth had been avoided, the child 
would often be adopted out. The peak years for this coincided with the second 
peak of the baby-boom in NZ, and the peaks for ex-nuptial conception/marital 
birth (NZ Official Yearbook 1990: 218).  
Once the stigma attached to ex-nuptial childbearing disappeared
16 , then 
cohabiting couples no longer felt the pressure to marry quickly. The extremely 
rapid adoption of the pill in most ESCs in the 1960s and 1970s (eg. For NZ see 
Pool et al. 1999 and 2000) provided a mechanism by which couples could cohabit 
with a degree of protection against unwanted pregnancy- abortion played a minor 
role in this transition. Ironically, the precipitate marriages at young ages of the 
late baby-boom were at high risk of divorce (Dharmalingam et all 1998), thus 
driving the very trends deplored by moralists worried about the future of the 
family. We are citing NZ here, but this scenario probably applies as much to the 
US as to NZ (Morgan et al 2001: 73, citing major American studies). 
                                                 
15 The Republican “Contract with America” 1994, went right back to this as it prescribed “tax 
incentives for adoption”). 
16 A not completely untypical notice from the Engagements Column, NZ Herald, in Oct 1995 read: 
“Jocelyn and Shane announce with glee, we’re engaged and about to become three.”  
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[Table 7 about here] 
 
Turning to causally more remote determinants, Table 2 presented earlier takes 
the cumulative proportions of women having a first birth by age 30 years, 
comparing all women with the least well-qualified and the most highly-educated 
women. Two trends are evident in this comparison. Firstly, the gap in cumulative 
fertility between all women and the least well-educated is low for all countries 
and all cohorts. Secondly, and in contrast, the gap between all women and those 
who are more highly qualified increases for recent cohorts. Generally, it is least in 
the Nordic countries (the Austrian data seem aberrant), and greatest in France and 
the ESCs, but with Italy being an extreme case. 
A far more precise analysis using live-births at any age shows, however, that 
the situation is far more complex than these comments might suggest. Above all, 
the differences between France and the United Kingdom stand out. French women 
are more likely to have births earlier, and the gap between educational statuses is 
lower for Britain (Eckert-Jaffe et al 2002; for NZ see Dharmalingam et al 2003) 
A comparison with the Nordic countries is interesting in another regard. 
Recalling that the social welfare supports are generally most advanced and 
developed in these countries, it is easy to see why rates of labour force 
participation among women with young children are also high, as is shown in 
Table 8. But in the ESCs, where support systems are far less developed, rates are 
higher than in most Continental and Southern European countries, albeit that they 
are not as elevated as for Scandinavia and Finland.  
France where support systems are very comprehensive, including for childcare 
(Eckert-Jaffe et al  2002; Letablier 2002) has notably high levels of participation. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
The question then arises: who cares for the young children of working mothers. 
For example, east German women “find it easier to combine childrearing and 
employment [than do their west German counterparts], thanks to the greater 
availability of children’s day care”. The “high work orientation” of east German 
women and the “unfavourable male employment situation” are also cited 
(Konietzka & Kreyenfeld 2002: 350). These points are of relevance when ESCs 
are analysed (see below). To take another case, by comparison with other WDCs 
there are lower rates of labour force participation in Southern Europe, where 
social welfare support for child care is limited. This suggests that a choice is made 
either for mothers to stay at home, or for family members, notably grandmothers, 
to provide this support, or, as Livi-Bacci and Salvini (2000: 247-48) show, for 
employed women to avoid childbearing.  
In lieu of more precise data to test this effect, a ratio based on the number of 
pre-school age children to women of “active/healthy” grandmother ages has been 
computed, and presented in Table 9. Subject to the caveats one must make about 
crude indices and about the instability of ratios as measures, the index does 
suggest that the potential for this form of familial support is greater in Japan and  
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Southern Europe than elsewhere in the WDCs. It is least in the Nordic countries, 
but in principle families there have access to publicly financed support systems, 
and the level is low for the Netherlands, where in any case rates of participation 
are lower. But the lowest potential for resort to grandmothers is found in the ESCs 
where non-familial support for childcare is also limited. A qualitative study 
carried out in Australia, England and New Zealand, the last by a co-author of this 
paper (Johnstone 2002; Cairns et al. 2002; Sceats 2002)
17 indicates that in the 
ESCs there would be little reluctance on the part of parents to have carers who are 
non-family members, who are appropriately qualified and if couples can afford 
this. There are precedents for this attitude. As in other WDCs, “wet-nursing” 
occurred historically in the ESCs, especially the UK, while for the middle and 
upper classes, nannies and boarding schools (especially for boys and even for 
young children) are British traditions exported to their colonies. 
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
5.  Higher Fertility in the ESCs: Alternative Explanations 
 
Factors of Demographic Composition and Dynamics 
This brief review of trends and of their determinants leaves open more 
questions than it answers. The data presented earlier have shown that, overall, 
levels of fertility and early childbearing are higher in the ESCs than elsewhere in 
the WDCs, and that the latter attribute is more marked among ethnic minorities 
and also the less well-educated. All this seems counterfactual to a policy 
environment that is targeted and parsimonious, and often designed to provide 
almost punitive responses to sub-populations whose reproductive patterns seem to 
provoke moral panics. Beyond this there is another puzzle: the ESC young parents 
have labour force participation rates just below the Nordic, but without the 
benefits either of  a comprehensive Scandinavian-style social security system and 
childcare (Gauthier 1996:189), or the potential support of the “Southern European 
grandmother” sort.  
Demographic composition seems to play a minor role in determining this 
pattern. For example, “It is sometimes suggested that the relatively high fertility, 
and other distinctive features of birth rates in the Neo-Europes, are not due to any 
distinctive behaviour among their European-origin or English-speaking 
population…”, but of their ethnic minorities. Yet, as was shown above, the 
impacts of minorities appear very limited, a result that confirms the conclusion of  
Chandola et al.(2002:185).. 
In contrast, as Chandola et al (2002) argue, early childbearing is clearly a more 
important factor. This can be demonstrated by adjusting the American TFR for the 
year 2000 by applying Swedish ASFRs at age-groups <20 years and 20-24, and 
                                                 
17 Although these studies were carried out independently in different countries and environments 
(especially in terms of transport and other difficulties, and transaction costs), an international 
metropolis (London), a large second-order city (Melbourne, Australia), and a small city and its 
rural-urban fringes (Hamilton, New Zealand), many of the the overall results were remarkably 
similar.  
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then using the US ASFRs from then on. Instead of their TFR being almost at 
replacement, the level would then be only 1.6, marginally higher than that of 
Sweden. Clearly, then, early childbearing has a significant effect on their 
reproduction. But what is really interesting is that if the same procedure is applied 
to ‘Whites’ only the results do not differ to any significant degree from those of 
the Total US population. Similarly, for NZ the adjusted rate is 1.7 as against a 
recorded one of 2.0. For Pakeha the same procedure also yields virtually the same 
figures.  
In sum, in both the US and NZ what is operating seems to be some sort of 
regime that applies to the national, minority and also majority European-origin 
populations. Thus there is a need to turn to other explanations of which two might 
be suggested. The first often cited as a possibility is labour market flexibility. The 
second possibility, we would hypothesise, lies in a complex of ideational factors, 
none of which provides on its own a sufficient or predominant explanation, but 
which together seem critical. 
 
Labour Market Flexibility 
“Labour market flexibility” is often offered as an explanation of the higher 
fertility of the ESCs, especially by advocates of neo-liberal economic policies; in 
the academic literature a more neutral phrase is likely to be used, such as “labour 
market arrangements /institutions” or simply “employment” (see Adsera 2002; 
McDowell 2001). The case for flexibility seems to rest on a set of assumptions, 
built on other assumptions: 
“Research on the type of jobs women hold sometimes assumes that 
‘female’ jobs have characteristics that make them more compatible with 
motherhood and that ‘flexible’ jobs are predominantly held by women, so 
that they can shape their employment around their work for the family and 
home…. Others have argued that predominantly female occupations 
require less effort ([citing Gary] Becker 1985 [J. Labor Econ.]) and are 
more flexible than other occupations, making it easier for employed 
women to combine jobs with home responsibilities” (Rosenfeld 1996: 199, 
212). 
Empirical analyses, especially those that might be the bases for modeling 
fertility-employment interlinkages, encounter major problems with these 
assumptions, that must by their very nature focus essentially on the role of women 
in the labour market. Not the least is the fact that the term “labour market 
flexibility” is inexact (Deakin and Reed, 2000:4). At a micro-level it is often seen 
as the availability of part-time work and casualisation, plus strategies by firms 
allowing labour inputs to vary according to the level of external demand for the 
firms’ output (Atkinson, 1985). “An important related trend has been from 
employment relationships to contract relationships” (Quiggin 2001:186). 
Moreover, at this level three basic assumptions seem unsustainable: “[I]t does not 
seem that flextime is a response to women’s needs to combine domestic work 
with labour market work; [in 1991 in the US] a greater proportion of men than 
women had flexible work schedules… To the extent that flexible jobs are also 
jobs with long and irregular hours, increases in this kind if work would be  
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expected to be associated with lower fertility… [and] women’s jobs are not easier 
or more accommodating,…” (Rosenfeld 1996: 210, 211, 212).  
When the effects of “flexibility” on families are studied qualitatively in more 
detail at a micro-level, some aspects become clearer. A cross-national analysis in 
Australia, Britain and New Zealand has raised some major questions. Micro-level 
flexibility definitely has some advantages for less well-off families where both 
parents need to work, and also are prepared to share child-minding and household 
duties, and to work different shifts. Casual and part-time jobs may also be the only 
feasible sources of jobs both for the working poor, especially sole-parent families, 
and even  for the better-off well-educated (Johnstone, 2002; Harris et al 2002; 
Sceats, 2002).  
At a macro-level, flexibility is a strategy aiming to remove some effects of 
labour supply on demand by firms and the economy in general, in ways that seem 
to privilege employers rather than workers.  
“The argument is that with expansion of the service sector, global 
competition, and rapidly changing technology, employers need the 
freedom to bring workers in, to arrange their work schedules – with 
possibly irregular days and hours – and to dismiss them as needed. 
Temporary contracts, subcontracting, part-time work, and work outside the 
regular workday schedule are some of the ways employers enact this 
flexibility” (Rosenfeld 1996: 208). 
In policy discourses “flexibility” has also been taken a step further. It has 
become associated with the reorientation of social welfare as this affects the 
relationship between capital and labour, and the costs of benefit systems. In short, 
it has become coupled with neo-liberal macro-level economic policy perspectives. 
A recent cross-comparative empirical study by Adsera gives no clear support 
for arguments favouring or against “flexibility”. In the United States where 
markets are deemed to be flexible, the opportunity costs of childbearing seem less 
because women appear to be able to re-enter jobs after the birth of their child. But 
equally well in Northern Europe, levels of fertility are higher yet seem to be 
related to state support for families, and also because the public sector is large. In 
southern Europe fertility trends are low both where flexibility is greater (Spain) 
and less (Italy). 
This leaves unanswered other questions (the macro-level implications of these 
are elaborated for Britain in McDowell 2001). Firstly, there is a fundamental 
question: why both partners must work when they have a young child, even when 
conditions are less than ideal. Indeed, “talk of a family-friendly workplace has 
remained talk, while conditions of employment have become steadily less family-
friendly” (Quiggin 2001:187). For example, there may be difficulties with 
childcare arrangements that typically in the ESCs will be ad hoc and not 
necessarily of high quality in terms of the “safety” and the social-emotional 
development of the child; or there may be the impacts of shift work on family life.
Obviously, however, this is the only way some families are able to survive 
economically. 
Secondly, there is the further fundamental question whether or not there are 
jobs. In many parts of Britain, for example, there is a “job deficit” (McDowell  
18 
2001: 453). Arguments based on low rates of unemployment as gauged through 
labour force surveys are likely to be spurious as the definitions used in these 
instruments are extremely restrictive: they define out of the labour force anyone 
who was not working or “actively” seeking a job in the reference period (normally 
last week/month). Where “job deficits” occur a large pool of potential workers 
will often not even try their hand at seeking work only to risk rejection, even 
where they have the resources to do so, such as transport and access to job 
agencies and pro-active programmes may not really address this issue.. British 
‘Workfare’ “schemes [called “New Deal”] concentrate on improving the quality 
of the labour supply through training in the main with little attention given to job 
creation” (Mc Dowell 2001: 452). 
Thirdly, for many couples, and especially women, the need is to secure and 
maintain status and advancement in careers to prepare for which they have 
invested heavily, and typically have postponed childbearing. “The combination of 
later childbearing and early retirement (also a feature of the ‘new’ economy) also 
implies that the early childhood period, at which the demands of childcare on 
parents’ time are most intensive, tends to coincide with the point at which 
standard career paths demand maximum commitment to the workforce” (Quiggin 
2001:185). This then reinforces other labour market patterns, notably gender 
trends in participation in the “high tech” as against “high touch” service 
occupations “that increasingly dominate advanced industrial economies”. But 
associated with these shifts are the growing income inequalities and status gaps 
between full- and part-time work. In Britain, “Full-time work for women is 
astonishingly strongly class differentiated… women who work continuously in 
full-time jobs not only tend themselves to hold higher status jobs than other 
women [and thus, if parents, to have an income allowing them to purchase quality 
childcare] but also to be partnered by men in high status employment” McDowell 
2001: 450, 451, 455). Thus part-time and casual workers seldom maintain the job 
status of their full time peers. Essentially, then, a product of this form of 
“flexibility” is a further segmentation of the labour force into full-time workers 
who have higher status, and part-time ones who have lower status and fewer 
prospects. It also effectively segments is into full-time women workers, especially 
higher professional and managerial, that is disproportionately childless or with 
very low fertility, as against part-time workers who have children and higher 
fertility. (Dharmalingam et al 2003).  
The need to work after childbearing often reinforces this segmentation, and thus 
risks increasing distinctions and inequalities. The cross-national quantitative study 
noted above states that in all three countries there is “little indication that women 
have the full range of choice in terms of employment options when they have 
children… Women in all countries commented on the frustration of being 
employed part time and a sense of not being taken seriously” (Sceats et al 2003). 
Fourthly, some larger employers, especially the public sector where female 
particpation rates are high, can provide better flexibility in work conditions, as in 
the Nordic countries. This also occurs in those ESCs (notably the United 
Kingdom) where this backed up by state intervention in the form of prescribed  
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durations of maternity leave (Sceats et al 2003). But as Gauthier (2002) shows, 
the ESCs are at the bottom end of the WDCs for these measures.  
Ultimately, however, even under the most favourable conditions, and for all 
except the small minority of women with high-paying jobs and superior back-up 
arrangements, the satisfactory functioning of flexible conditions is ultimately 
dependent on individual situations “… a supportive boss, supportive husband, or a 
handy grandmother nearby. If these are present then the lack of policy support is 
mitigated, and conversely if they are absent it can be difficult, even in an 
organization that is “family friendly”. An unsympathetic boss or supervisor, for 
instance can make or break the situation for a working mother” (Sceats et al 2003). 
 
Ideational Factors 
As has been noted already, it is clear that policy instruments extant in the ESCs 
do not have a pro-natalist effect. In principle, they should have -- or rather the 
lack of a universal and comprehensive system should have -- exactly the inverse 
effect. Nor does labour market flexibility, whatever this might mean,  appear to be 
the magic formula. For want of a more exact explanation of the higher fertility of 
the ESCs, it seems, therefore, that one must turn to some set of underlying values 
and norms that predispose ESCs to higher fertility, achieved among other ways 
through a greater force of reproduction at earlier ages not only among minorities, 
but also by European-origin majority populations. 
The values system in the ESCs, especially for the majority populations, comes 
from a shared experience of being “British”, mainly as colonies but also as 
independent countries that maintain close links with the UK, as most public policy 
analysts argue. But, is there something more fundamental than this common 
origin and language?  The data presented earlier have indicated some differences 
between the Neo-Europes and their former metropole, the UK, even though socio-
political interactions are often close: as recently as the late 1960s NZ was still 
linked closely economically and many other ways (Belich 2001 passim). That said, 
the processes of migration and colonisation have meant that, for example, 
“Australia and NZ, unlike Britain, have relatively shallow kinship structures…” 
(Thorns 1992: 254). This is a factor of importance in the area of family policy. 
The net result of the migrations from Europe is that the ESCs are rather 
different from all other groupings of countries in this volume except Japan. This is 
because most ESCs are outside Europe, and 84% of the ESCs population live in 
Neo-Europes. Of course, the US alone accounts for 71% of the total. 
The ESCs do have a common history that extends, however, beyond the simple 
links of colonisation and migration. They share a distinct set of “cultural” 
traditions, but the similarities go far beyond what are normally seen as cultural 
factors, say ethnicity, language, religion, family ties of “kith and kin”, norms and 
mores. Rather, the factors that comprise this shared culture, in a broader sense of 
the word, are also some macro-economic, macro-social and macro-cultural 
attributes, and some micro-social norms and expectations. 
Along with these common experiences the Neo-European ESCs also seem to 
share a “cultural” tradition around their trends in reproduction, and this may well 
affect contemporary patterns. We noted earlier that, at early settlement, crude  
20 
birth rates (CBR) were often higher for European-origin Neo-European than for 
European populations, even England and Wales and Scotland, and were driven by 
early and almost universal childbearing. In the 1870s for Pakeha New Zealanders 
the TFR was almost 7.0. The CBR was lower than the TFR might suggest, at 42 
per 1000, because of the very high masculinity ratio in the immigrant population. 
The Neo-European ESC rates then declined significantly to around those in 
Europe. An exception was Canada whose levels declined in most provinces, even 
pioneer Manitoba, but nationally were maintained at relatively higher levels (1921 
4.0 births per woman, vs 2.9 for Pakeha NZ) because of higher levels of fertility 
in Quebec.  Neo-European rates then decreased further, so that by the Depression 
-- again with the exception of Canada because of the higher rates in Quebec at all 
ages 20+years, and especially 25+ -- levels were barely at replacement, 
resembling Northwestern Europe. Most importantly they fell well below those of 
Catholic Southern Europe ((Henripin 1968: 25, 30; see also Romaniuc 1984:14-
16; Sceats and Pool 1985: Fig 25; Festy 1979:241-97). For Pakeha New Zealand, 
for example, they dropped below replacement in every year 1932-37 (Khawaja 
1985: Figure 21, Table 73, 154).  
Of more than passing interest is the rapid decline in fertility in the Neo-Europes 
in the late 19
th century, and their lower levels relative to much of Northwestern 
Europe and the Mediterranean over the first few decades of the twentieth century, 
even in pioneer zones like Manitoba (see above), or, by 1901, in the newly settled 
interior North Island of New Zealand (Pool and Tiong 1991). This point should be 
put alongside the fact that in several Neo-Europes sub-replacement fertility was 
reached in the depression (see also British Columbia in 1937, Henripin 1968: 30). 
This means that arguments about inherent higher fertility arising from a frontier 
spirit and the optimistic expectations this might engender, are not particularly 
persuasive. 
Below we will argue that there is recent memory of high fertility by WDC 
standards in the ESCs, but this brief history of the “culture” of reproduction also 
implies that two other factors may be of significance. There may also be a longer-
term residual memory of sub-replacement fertility. Moreover, there is a long 
history not only of exceptionally high fertility by any standards in the pioneer 
period, but since then also of a series of rapid ebbs, then waves (Baby-boom), 
then more ebbs etc., that by WDC standards have been radical, even in recent 
memory.   
This could be compared with the more or less continuous decreases in fertility 
over several decades seen in, say, Japan or Southern Europe. This could mean that 
the ESCs have somehow developed strategies for fitting fertility trends to macro-
social and economic circumstances, something that other WDCs are still coming 
to terms with. It is instructive that the countries that had lower fertility during the 
depression (TFR at replacement or below) typically had higher fertility in the 
1990s (1.7+ births/woman) ( eg ESCs, except Canada; France), and vice-versa (eg 
Italy, Spain, Netherlands; cf Festy 1979:241-97 and Rindfuss and Brewster 1996: 
Table 1; Appendix to our paper).  
Critical to this is a point raised earlier. The ESCs were the first WDCs to go 
through economic modernisation, to “become richest earliest subsequently grow  
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more slowly and [to be] gradually overtaken…” (Castles 1993b: 28), and this was 
to shape their social morphology as much as their economic structures. For 
example, some Neo-Europes had exceptionally high levels of life-expectation in 
the latter years of the 19
th century, with New Zealand arguably the highest (Pool 
& Cheung 2002). This early modernisation also affected expectations about 
wealth and the notion that the path to development followed by these societies 
was the ideal model for others to follow
18.   
Recently the ESCs, especially the US, have played a major role in developing 
and branding the so-called “New Economy”. According to the reviewer of a 
recent book by Robert Reich, its growth  
“encourages a division between the talented few and the routine many: it 
also results in greater insecurity for everyone, leading them to work harder, 
[and] promote themselves more relentlessly…  the traditional job for life 
provided not just security but structure… [although] over the course of 
history, structure has been of  negligible importance in the world of 
work… work has been about survival, and structure has come, if at all, 
from other sources, for the most part feudal or religious” (Seabright 2002; 
see also Quiggin 2001). 
The higher levels of skill, and the costs involved in achieving these, as 
demanded by the “flexible economy”, create further insecurities between 
aspirations for structure and progression, and the realities of the job market (see 
also McDowell 2001; Quiggin 2001). For the less skilled, a lack of qualifications 
produces further tensions (Seabright 2002). Symptomatic of this is the decimation 
of traditional manufacturing in regions across the WDCs, and the resultant job 
losses there, as against the growth of financial and information industries 
increasingly concentrated in favoured areas.  
It is this aspect of structure that is critical for the present paper. In the 1980s 
and 1990s, the ESCs entered enthusiastically into restructuring, as has been 
documented earlier in this paper, emphasising, inter alia, flexible labour markets, 
contracting, out-sourcing and similar management strategies. Accompanying this 
have been major shifts in ESC family policy environments taking away many of 
the mechanisms for reconciling family life and the workplace. As yet, however, 
the ESCs  have not created viable, alternative structures. In contrast, familialism 
in Southern Europe or the policy frameworks of the Nordic countries achieve this 
harmonisation. As in the former East Germany, moreover, in the ESCs it is 
typically men in manufacturing and some clerical industries who have most 
keenly felt the impacts of restructuring.  
These changes may have affected fertility in the ESCs in two ways. Firstly, 
skilled women will have been those who delayed pregnancy in order to train and 
to gain significant career experience. This shows up in the data on education and 
cumulative fertility presented earlier in this paper, and in the polarisation of 
reproductive force identified for the ESCs in particular. A recent paper comparing 
the United Kingdom and France pinpoints the effects of this and of the tensions 
                                                 
18 This is implicit in the vast literature on modernisation emanating primarily from the United 
States in the era of functionalist sociology ; more recently the Anglo-Saxon Reagan/Thatcher 
model of economic restructuring has become widely applied by Bretton Woods agencies.   
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noted earlier. In Britain “State intervention is minimal, while France practiced a 
generous family policy. The net result is that social polarization of fertility is 
significant in Britain but not in France. Becoming a mother or moving to higher 
parities is more difficult for better educated British women than for their French 
counterparts” (Eckert-Jaffe et al 2002: 491 and 507). These factors must be 
among those that explain why France has maintained a consistent and relatively 
high level of fertility  by WDC standards (Letablier 2002) 
Three qualitative studies carried out in England, New Zealand and Australia 
(Cairns  et al 2002; Johnstone 2002; Sceats 2002) show that highly qualified, 
career-oriented women often have the financial means to purchase private sector 
childcare when they have only one child. But it becomes increasingly difficult to 
sustain full-time work once they have a second child. In this context, it hardly 
needs to be mentioned that the relationship between education and fertility is two-
way: it is those women who avoided early childbearing who have the 
qualifications referred to here.  
Job loss among men, especially in less skilled and manual occupations, has 
often meant, as in eastern Germany, that women enter the labour market as the 
principal breadwinner, on whom the family, in the absence of comprehensive 
benefits, becomes dependent. Similar pressures exist for sole parents whose 
households in ESCs have the lowest incomes (eg for NZ see Johnstone & Pool 
1996). “Workfare” and related schemes implemented by public policy agencies in 
numerous ESC jurisdictions, aiming to pressure women, in particular and 
including sole parents, to go back into the labour force, have increased these 
tensions. For example, Britain “has bought into the workfare ideal… Mothers of 
dependent children are now expected to work,…”  even sole parents (McDowell 
2001: 452). There are calls for the cutting of welfare, and these are linked to 
fertility, but retrospectively for those who have children already
19. One might add 
that it is the early starters and minority women who are disproportionately 
affected by these policies. 
Early modernisation was accompanied, at least in Australia, NZ, the UK, and to 
a lesser degree Canada, by legislation laying down the bases of welfare states. As 
was noted earlier, these privileged the stereotypical family through emphasising 
the “social wage”, so that the family or widow of a working man who had fallen 
on hard times would be maintained at a level of well-being not far below that of 
the average working man’s family. But this model was eroded over time, and then 
in the dying decades of the 20
th century was radically restructured into targeted 
forms of social assistance. In a curious way, however, this factor may be 
positively associated with fertility, rather than being anti-natalist. It is the less well 
off with higher cumulative probabilities of fertility by say 30 years who are most 
                                                 
19 Families not on welfare also face pressures coming from the economic costs of childrearing, 
increasing expectations and values surrounding “quality” of childcare, including regulations 
relating to equipment that is legally deemed “safe”. An example in automobile dependent ESCs 
lacking adequate public transport would be toddler car seats that meet safety standards, but that 
have the effect of limiting the number of children able to be carried in a typical family car, a 
contrast with the baby-boom when 3-4 would be transported unrestrained, The costs of education 
are also an issue, even where children attend public schools but are required to spend on “extras”. 
See Sceats (2002), Cairns et al (2002) and Johnstone (2002).  
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likely to seek such benefits; the better off have achieved this status frequently 
because they stay childless as long as possible as they lay down their careers and 
equity (Johnstone & Pool 1996). 
Of course, the paths of causality are far from unidirectional: early childbearing 
by accident or by design, recalling that this a culture that still has a strong memory 
of such patterns, places many couples in a vulnerable situation so that they must 
seek targeted assistance. Typically, however, this is so parsimonious that, contrary 
to what neo-conservatives argue about “sending out the wrong messages” 
(Richardson 1995), the availability of targeted benefits is not itself a sufficient 
reason for early childbearing  
Economic modernisation in the ESCs had come, in the main, first from the 
manufacturing and associated exploitative (eg coal mining) and trading sectors, 
and later from service industrial growth. This naturally led these countries into 
early urbanisation. What is less evident is why Neo-Europes dependent on the 
export of primary commodities – New Zealand is the extreme example – also 
urbanised at an early stage. By 1900, and this was still the case in 1950, the 
highest levels of urbanisation were found in Oceania (Australia and New Zealand: 
22% of the population in 1900, 39% in 1950), followed  by North America (19%, 
29%), and Europe (15%, 21%). For the World as a whole the proportions were 
6% (1900) and 13% (1950) (Lampard 1967: Table 3). By 1911, three-quarters of 
the British population was urban,  as was half the New Zealand; and by 1920 
more than 50 % of Americans were also urban (Coleman & Salt 1992: 86; Pool & 
Bedford 1996: 14; National Commission on Urban Problems, US, 1969: 
40).Within Europe in the 1930s, the percent of the UK’s population urban (76%) 
was only exceeded by the proportions for Belgium and the Netherlands; the rate 
for England and Wales (excluding the other countries in the UK) equaled those in 
the Low Countries. Most European countries were still below 50%, the exceptions 
being Austria (61%), France (52) and Italy (52), with Germany alone (70%) 
resembling but not equaling the UK (Kirk 1946, reprinted 1968).    Levels of 
urbanisation in the individual countries around which this paper’s interest 
revolves are presented in Table 10 for 1950 to 1990. With the exception of Ireland, 
the ESCs still figured as among the more urbanised WDCs through the entire 
post-War period.  
 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
It could also be argued that early urbanisation in the ESCs tended to take a 
different form from that found elsewhere in the ESCs. Low density housing, 
terraced/row houses, semi-detached or detached dwellings became the mode in 
the ESCs in the late 19
th or early 20
th centuries, whereas multi-storey apartments 
were more common in the big cities of the continent.
20 This was particularly true 
for the Neo-Europes, except say in the large eastern seaboard cities of North 
                                                 
20 These comments on housing are based on personal observation plus very useful discussions with 
Prof. David Thorns, NZ’s most eminent urban sociologist, Canterbury University; and with Assoc. 
Prof. David Swain, a Waikato University family sociologist whose current research on 
genealogical data sources in the UK, NZ and other EDCS has confirmed many of these points.  
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America that were the normal ports of entry for immigrants, but it even held true 
in the UK. Early developments in commuter transport systems were led by the 
ESCs, most notably the automobile that spawned the suburbia of the Neo-Europes. 
The ESCs also led the way in the shift to owner-occupied housing, in its 
commodification as it were, and this led to differences in provision for the less 
well off : the rental housing estate that is publicly funded, versus the institution of 
rent-controls on private sector rental housing (Barlow & Duncan 1994: Figs 2.1 & 
2.2; Harloe 1995: Chapt 1).  From the 1920s in the UK and in other ESCs 
Building Societies 
21and other mutual benefit associations were helping couples to 
finance dwellings. The overall result was that by the time directly comparable 
home ownership data become available the ESCs stand out. In 1971 only Iceland 
in the western countries had higher levels than Australia (69%), NZ (68), US (63), 
Canada (56), Belgium (56) and, lowest among ESCs, Britain (50). Other WDCs 
for which data are available came further down below 50%. In Australia and NZ 
the level was already at 50-60% in 1945 (Kilmartin & Thorns 1978: 22, 104). 
The argument here is that the early modernization and its accompaniment 
urbanisation, plus the early introduction of welfare state measures, and the forms 
these took, together created a distinctive values system. At an early stage, ESC 
populations developed the modalities that allowed them to accommodate family 
formation to urban living, and even as we suggested earlier, to how patterns of 
reproduction were adapted early on to meet economic changes.  
Then after World War II the baby-boom reproductive regimes associated with 
suburban family life in a detached house (as described in William Whyte’s “The 
Organization Man”, 1960: chapts 23 & 24) set the values for later generations, at 
least in the Neo-Europes, cutting across all European-origin social groups, as 
evidenced by earlier data presented here on education and cumulative fertility. 
These baby boom regimes involved inter alia a return to marked levels of early 
reproductive force that had also characterized the pioneer period. It may have 
been easier for very young parents to raise a family in a detached suburban house 
than in an apartment, provided they had the means to buy a home.
22. Moreover, 
with changing values about the “quality” of childrearing there is increasing 
opposition to the notion of children, particularly of different ages and/or genders, 
sharing bedrooms, the norm earlier in the 20
th century. This left, as it were, a 
recent residual memory of fertility levels that were high by WDC standards, even 
Mediterranean European, yet realized in a peculiar urbanized environment of 
owner occupied detached dwellings. 
But today in the ESCs the trend is also for childbearing and childcare 
polarization, that also often parallels a dichotomisation into “work rich” and 
“work poor” households (McDowell 2001: 452). Typically, this is between the 
better off, frequently the late-starting parents, who have the means for this 
“suburban”, or quasi-suburban inner city (say a large owner-occupied row house), 
child-rearing, as well as the capacity to buy “quality” child care. “In the United 
                                                 
21 The 1916 New Zealand census reported 53% of dwellings were owner-occupied (typically of 
course being bought with a mortgage or by time-payment). 
22 The means of purchasing varied across the Neo-Europes, but frequently involved some form of 
family support.  
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States, for example, women’s childcare choices are circumscribed by their 
economic resources” (Rindfuss and Brewster 1996: 282).  The obtaining of 
quality care in ESCs where there is limited state support for this (cf France), may 
be most easily achieved by women in full-time employment in high status jobs. 
But to be in this position, they will often have had to delay childbearing so as to 
pursue their education, and may end up childless, or with a completed family size 
below what they might have desired.  
In contrast, there are the less well-off who start childbearing earlier, and thus 
often do not have the chance gain the better qualifications that would afford them 
a comparable family environment, or for that matter quality childcare for their 
children. They are faced with a struggle on benefits, or on low incomes gained by 
whosoever of the couple has a job. With targeting, couples ineligible for benefits 
may find it especially difficult to provide such an environment and there may be a 
need for both parents to work.  This is further complicated when males face 
unemployment or low paid jobs. “At low levels of [male relative income], young 
people learn to look at the income-producing power of female earnings: the 
income effects on fertility of a woman’s earnings increases at such times” 
(Macunovich 1996: 251). One can take this argument a step further and infer that, 
in order to maintain a minimal level of wellbeing, less well-of couples with 
children might equally well accept, albeit reluctantly, benefit income accruing to 
the mother and child. 
The consequence of all this for the ESCs is both demographic (fertility) and 
benefit polarisation (see also Eckert-Jaffe et al 2002; Dharmalingam et al 2003), 
between those families that need welfare and those who do not seek it, even if 
sometimes the need is there. It is this dichotomisation that undoubtedly drives the 
moral panic prevalent in the ESCs, expressed often in terms with eugenics’ 
overtones: the wrong people having children (Pool 1996). That the higher profile 
early childbearing groups are also often the more visible minorities adds to 
polarisation in public discourses. The policy response, moreover, has not been to 
formulate “family friendly” policies relating to work and childcare that might 
bolster reproduction, but to argue for rather punitive measures that aim at 
pressuring the unmarried poor not to have children (Contract with America 1994; 
Richardson 1995: 213-14). 
 
6.  Conclusion  
Analysis of differences in fertility patterns between WDCs is remarkably 
difficult today because levels of variance are relatively low. Thus it is almost 
impossible to draw robust and authoritative conclusions. 
Nevertheless, this paper has shown that the fertility levels of the ESCs are 
higher than for most WDCS, and that this seems to occur in a policy environment 
that has fewer of the possible supports for childbearing and rearing that are seen in 
France or Nordic countries. Labour market flexibility also did not seem to explain 
relatively elevated rates.  
We posited and showed that, instead, in the ESCs there is a long developed, 
shared culture and norms, albeit often latent, rather than manifest (to use the 
terminology of functionalist sociology), based on a relatively common origin but  
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reinforced by the diffusion across the group of social and economic ideologies and 
values. The resulting value system is something more than merely the effects of 
colonisation and migration. In the ESCs it seems to produce higher fertility driven 
to a significant degree by early childbearing. This appears to occur despite a 
policy environment that is parsimonious and targeted, is certainly not pro-natalist 
(Gauthier and Hatzius 1997), and provides benefits that are insufficient to offset 
increasing costs associated with bringing up children. Families are supported by a 
‘residual’ welfare system mutated in most ESC countries from the early essays 
into welfare statism, that privileged married men and their families. This earlier 
policy emphasis on “married” couples may explain also the current concerns 
about ex-nuptial childbearing and cohabitation.  
The remaining vestiges of these former systems may be residual in yet another 
sense. Resort is made to them because of a ‘residual memory’ of what existed not 
too long ago when young couples and their children, born very soon after 
marriage, could take up neo-local residence in a detached owner-occupied single-
family dwelling, often financed with state support. Today owner-occupation is 
becoming far more difficult for the young at key reproductive ages. Between 1986 
and 1996 the percentages in this category in  New Zealand declined significantly 
from 62% to 53% at 25-34 years; from 78% to 72% at 35-44 years (N.Z Census of 
1986 and 1996) A qualitative study reports that frequently NZ women will recite a 
widespread belief that “NZ is a great place in which to bring up children”, but 
then will add a newly emerging caveat, “but it is becoming more and more 
difficult” (Sceats 2002). Indeed among sub-populations the effects of these 
emerging difficulties may already be becoming apparent, as TFRs in some NZ 
areas drop to levels reminiscent more of continental Europe than of ESCs (Pool 
2002: 34-35). 
This raises then the question: are barriers to fertility becoming such in the ESCs 
that they will outweigh longstanding cultural values? Are the ESCs, despite all 
their distinctiveness today, facing a future ultimately not too different from that 
diagnosed for the European Union: “…continued below-replacement fertility,…” 
(Lesthaeghe & Willems 1999: 227). Could the absence of policy props, and the 
advocacy
23  and promulgation of further neo-liberal policy measures revolving 
around work-family linkages have negative implications for fertility in the ESCs, 
for example?  Rindfuss and Brewster have argued that “changes in work and 
childcare arrangements…may induce fertility decline” (1996: 282). 
But one cannot ignore another dimension of  this. What if the ESCs were to see 
their fertility return upwards towards replacement? Would they effect this 
transition as rapidly as they did in the past as they moved through transitions, in 
and out of the baby-boom? 
                                                 
23 There are strong voices advocating further workfare type measures among senior neo-
conservatives close to the Cabinet in the US; in NZ a senior parliamentary conservative, a former 
Reserve Bank Governor has made a strident call of this sort. In Britain the Blair government is 
implementing a number of such measures (McDowell 2001).   
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Table 1:  Number of children ever born - alive by age of women (% with zero, one 
and two-plus children), selected WDCs, 1990s 
 
Age Group  35 – 39  40 – 44  45 – 49  50 – 54  55 – 59 
Number of children  0 1 2+ 0 1 2+ 0 1 2+ 0 1 2+  0 1 2+
Country(ies)                 
ENGLISH  SPEAKING                  
 Canada    22  15 63 16 13 71 14 11 75 8  10  82  -  -  - 
  New Zealand   11  12 77 11  8  81  9   9  82 7   6  87  10  6  84
  FRANCE   11  18 71  8  22 70 12 17 71 -  -  -  -  -  - 
GERMAN/DUTCH 
SPEAKING 
                
 Austria    14  25 61 8  24 68 9  21 70 8  19  73  -  -  - 
  Belgium*  12  21 67 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
  Netherlands***  17  16 67 15   7  70 - - - - - - - - - 
  Switzerland    23  16 71 20 15 65 16 15 69 - - - - - - 
 NORDIC                 
  Denmark   16  19  6  12 18 70 10 16 74 -  -  -  -  -  - 
  Finland    13  22 65 13 22 65 12 18 70 - - - - - - 
  Norway***  9 14 77   7  14 79 - - - - - - - - - 
  Sweden***  12  17 61 12 14 64 - - - - - - - - - 
SOUTHERN  EUROPEAN                  
  Greece    8  18 74  8  15 77  7  10 83 -  -  -  -  -  - 
  Italy   17  26 57 11 23 66  9  20 71 -  -  -  -  -  - 
  Portugal   12  23 65  8  22 70  9  20 71 -  -  -  -  -  - 
  Spain    9  19 72 10 13 77  7  12 81 -  -  -  -  -  - 
 
Source:  Appendix Table 12, ECE/FFS Standard Country Reports for Selected 
Countries. 
-     = No data     
*  Flemish regions only    
**  40-42 years rather than 40-44 
***  Age groups 38 & 43  
 
Table 2:  The timing of fertility: cumulative percentage (1) of all, (2) of least well educated (ISCED 0-2) and (3) of best 
educated (ISCED 5-6) female respondents, by cohort, who by 30 years, have had a first birth, selected WDCs 
 
  Birth Cohort of 
  1936-40 1941-45 1946-50  1951-55    1956-60  1961-65 
Educational Level  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Country(ies) 
ENGLISH SPEAKING 
                        
  Canada*  77 84 62 77 83 60 75 85 51 67 82 49 67 88 43 -  -  - 
  New Zealand   85 89 62  85 88 78  82 83 69 77 81 62 77 81 64 (74) (83) (50) 
 FRANCE**  -  - -  - - -  80 92 57 85 89 73 81 88 59 (72) (81) 47 
GERMAN/DUTCH 
SPEAKING 
                        
  Austria    -  - -  86 89 86 86 82 94 86 85 81 77 75 72 (78) (79) (85) 
 Belgium    -  -  - -  -  -       83  87  86  (79) (85) (64) - - - 
  Netherlands**  -  - -  - - -  - - -  76 86 44 69 78 46 (58) (69) (31) 
  Switzerland    -  - -  - - -  74 85 54 65 84 33 63 78 24 (57) (77) (24) 
N O R D I C                           
  Denmark  ***  -  - -  - - -  85 89 71 81 86 67 75 82 62 (67) (79) (55) 
  Finland    -  - -  - - -  80 86 63 79 82 65 80 86 69 (69) (77) (55) 
  Norway    -  - -  - - -  86 90 84 85 94 74 78 96 60 -  -  - 
  Sweden    -  - -  - - -  80 84 72 75 83 68 75 81 66 -  -  - 
SOUTHERN  EUROPEAN                          
  Greece    -  - -  - - -  - - -  85 90 82 82 90 70 81 92 48 
  Italy    -  - -  - - -  84 89 39 80 89 41 70 84 14 (64) (80) (9) 
  Portugal    -  - -  - - -  86 87 79 86 88 74 84 88 70 82 88 57 
  Spain    -  - -  - - -  85 87 68 82 85 53 82 85 63 (70) (80 (45) 
Source:  Appendix Tables 14 & 17, ECE/FFS Standard Country Reports for Selected Countries. For further points see notes Table 1. 
*   ISCED 4 
** ISCED  4-6 



















































































Table 3:  1990s selected WDCS: Early force of reproduction  
 
Country(ies)  % of TFR at 15-24 years 
ENGLISH SPEAKING   
 Australia    24 
 Canada  29 
 Ireland  31 
 New  Zealand  29 
 United  Kingdom  30 
 United  States  41 
 Mean  31 
CONTINENTAL  
 Austria  33 
 Belgium  26 
 France  21 
 Germany  24 
 Netherlands  13 
 Mean  23 
JAPAN 16 
NORDIC  
 Denmark  19 
 Norway  23 
 Sweden  22 
 Mean  22 
MEDITERRANEAN  
 Italy  18 
 Spain  15 
 Mean  17 
 
Sources:United Nations (various years) Demographic Yearbooks 
  Unpublished data, see end of References  
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Table 4: Setting the parameters of the baby boom 
 
 Average   
TFR 
Early Force of Childbearing  Post-boom 
Decline
1 
  1955-65  1960  1965 1970 1975  1980 
Country(ies) 
ENGLISH SPEAKING 
         
  Australia    3.3  1.3  1.1 1.1 0.9  0.7  1.5 
  Canada  3.8  1.5  1.2 0.9 0.7  0.6  2.1 
 Ireland
2  3.8  0.6  0.7 0.8 0.8  0.7  1.5 
 New  Zealand
3  4.1  1.6  1.4 1.4 1.1  0.9  2.0 
  United  Kingdom 2.7  1.0  1.1 1.0 0.8  0.7  0.8 
  United  States  3.5  1.7  1.3 1.2 0.8  0.8  1.6 
CONTINENTAL             
 Austria
4  2.7  1.1  1.1 1.1 0.9  0.8  1.2 
  Belgium  2.6  0.9  1.0 0.9 0.7  0.7  1.0 
  France  2.8  0.9  1.0 0.9 0.8  0.7  1.0 
 (W)  Germany
5  2.3  (2.4)  0.7  0.9 0.8 0.5  0.5  1.0 
  Netherlands  3.1  0.6  0.7 0.7 0.5  0.4  1.6 
JAPAN  2.1  0.6  0.6 0.5 0.6  0.4  0.4 
NORDIC           
  Denmark  2.6  1.1  1.1 0.8 0.8  0.6  1.0 
  Norway  2.9  1.0  1.1 1.1 0.9  0.7  1.1 
  Sweden  2.3  0.8  0.9 0.8 0.7  0.6  0.4 
MEDITERRANEAN             
 Italy
6  2.4  0.6  0.8 0.8 0.8  0.6  1.1 
 Spain
7 2.8  0.6  -  0.7  0.8  0.8  (0.4)  1.3 
 
1  Absolute change in births per.woman, 1955-65 to 1985-90 
2 1961,  1966… 
3 1962 
4 1961… 
5  Figures in brackets are for all of Germany. The West German figure is for 1960 
6 1971 
7  1960, 1970, 1974, 1978, (1986) 
Sources:  TFRs, United Nations (2002) Projection & Estimate 
    ASFRs.  (1)  United Nations (various years) Demographic Year Book 
      (2)  Country sources noted in References, “Unpublished” at end  
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Table 5: Majority and minority fertility patterns 
 
Births per woman  English-speaking Countries   
 Canada
1 New  Zealand
2    United States
3 Germany
4 
TOTAL FERTILITY RATE         
1970        
 Majority  2.4  3.0  2.4  2.3 
 Minority  2.0  5.2  3.1  2.2 
 Total  2.3  3.2  2.4  - 
1990       1.4 
 Majority  1.7  2.2  2.0  1.6 
 Minority  1.6  2.2  2.5  - 
 Total  1.8  2.2  2.1   
EARLY-CHILDBEARING
5        
1970        
 Majority  -  1.3  1.1  0.8 
 Minority  1.7  2.3  1.7  1.8 
 Total  1.9  1.4  1.2  - 
1990        
 Majority  -  0.6  0.8  0.3 
 Minority  0.5  1.2  1.4  0.9 
 Total  0.6  0.7  0.9  - 
 
Sources: see References “unplublished” at end  
-  = No data  
1  “Minority”, of European-origin but mainly Francophone, Quebec; “Majority”: Ontario, an 
Anglophone province is used 
2  “Minority”, the Polynesian-origin indigenous Maori; “Majority” European-origin “Pakeha” 
3 “Minority”,  African-Americans,  “Majority” “white” Americans 
4  West Germany is taken as the “Majority”; East Germany as the “Minority” 
5  Births per woman, ages <25 years = 5 x (ASFR<20 + ASFR20-24) 
  
 
Table 6:  Partnership Formation:  Cumulative Percentage of Female Respondents, by Cohort, who by age 25 years 
(1) were in a first partnership (P) of any sort; or (2) were in a first marriage (M) without any prior 
partnership, selected WDCs 
Birth cohorts of:  1936-40  1941-45  1946-50  1951-55  1956-60  1961-65  1966-70 
Partnership/Marriage  P M  P  M  P M  P M  P M  P M  P M 
Country(ies)                      
ENGLISH  SPEAKING                      
 Canada*  79 79  79  77  82 74  78 58  81 49  74 32 -  - 
 New  Zealand    82 77  85  76  82 68  85 54  89 38  85 25 (85)  (20) 
FRANCE**  -  -  -  - 85 68  86 63  84 48  82 33 (76)  (16) 
GERMAN/DUTCH  SPEAKING                      
 Austria    -  -  84  70  83 60  84 45  78 31  81 23 (74)  (14) 
  Belgium    - -  -  -  - -  89  80  88  73  (76)  (59)  - - 
 Netherlands**  -  -  -  - -  - 85 65  84 53  82 31 (71)  (21) 
 Switzerland    -  -  -  - 76 56  73 38  74 25  74 17 (67)  (16) 
N O R D I C                       
  Denmark  ***  - -  -  -  - -  - -  - -  78  8 (730  (7) 
  Finland    -  -  75  65 77  60 81  35 81  17 (78) (9)  -  - 
  Norway    - -  81 70  82  54  84  37  81  22  - - - - 
 Sweden    -  -  -  - 88 17  85 8 84 6 84 6  -  - 
SOUTHERN  EUROPEAN                      
 Greece    -  -  -  - -  - 79 68  78 58  81 58 75 46 
 Italy    -  -  -  - 79 76  76 72  67 62  62 55 (41)  (36) 
 Portugal    -  -  -  - 78 67  80 70  76 68  74 61 64 50 
 Spain    -  -  -  - 75 73  76 73  78 73  70 61 (53)  (43) 
Source:  Appendix Table 8, ECE/FFS Standard Country Reports, for selected countries. For further points see notes Table 1. 
Note:  (P) – (M) = Consensual Cohabitation 
* The actual birth years vary marginally around the reference groupings used here 
-  = No data 
Parentheses ( ) are used where cohorts have not yet reached 25 years of age. 




















































































Table 7:  New Zealand, total, nuptial, ex-nuptial and ex-nuptially conceived 














  No. No.  %  No. %  No.  %  No.  % 
1962 65,127  59,157  91  8,356  13  5,242  8  13,598  21 
1972 63,215  57,725  83  7,689  12  9,345  15 17,.34  27 
1972 49,938  38,147  77  3,512  7  11,288  23 14,800  30 
1992 59,268  38,080  64  -  -  21,188  36 -  - 
Sources:  Dept of Statistics (various years), Vital Statistics. 
      Dept of Statistics (1982), Demographic Trends 
-    = no data 
*   Most of these would be within the first nine months, see Pool and Crawford  (1980); 
Morgan et al 2001 
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Table 8: Percentage of women currently employed, among those in the cohorts 
with the largest number who have a child of (1) nursery school age (ages 
0-2); (2) kindergarten age (3-6) and (3) primary school age (7-12 years). 
Selected WDCs 
 






Country(ies)      
ENGLISH-SPEAKING      
 Canada  40  53  64 
 New  Zealand  40  57*  65 
FRANCE 56  67  71 
GERMAN/DUTCH 
SPEAKING 
    
 Austria  21  48  65 
 Belgium  28  30  31 
 Netherlands  43  44  48 
 Switzerland  37  44  54 
NORDIC      
 Denmark  79  83  84 
 Finland  36  88  94 
 Norway  59  70  82 
 Sweden  51  78  90 
SOUTHERN EUROPEAN       
 Greece  44  40  44 
 Italy  46  39  43 
 Portugal  -  -  - 
 Spain  41  34  41 
 
Source:   Appendix Table 31, ECE/FFS Standard Country Reports, for selected 
countries. For further points see notes Table 1. 
Note:  Because of definitional, calibrational and time-reference (hours worked) 
problems all currently employed (full- and part-time) are included 
*  Average of two cohorts with identical n’s  
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Country 1955  1995 
ENGLISH SPEAKING     
 Australia  1.22  0.82 
 Canada  1.71  0.75 
 Ireland  1.15  0.85 
 New  Zealand  1.42  0.96 
 United  Kingdom  0.64  0.64 
  United States of America  1.22  0.87 
CONTINENTAL    
 Austria  0.53  0.53 
 Belgium  0.65  0.55 
 France  0.76  0.62 
 Germany  0.57  0.41 
 Netherlands  1.16  0.65 
JAPAN 1.63  0.38 
NORDIC    
 Denmark  0.83  0.61 
 Norway  0.85  0.75 
 Sweden  0.67  0.64 
SOUTHERN EUROPE     
 Italy  0.87  0.39 
 Spain  1.05  0.45 
Western Developed Countries  1.00  0.60 
 
Source:  United Nations (2000) Estimates &  Projections 
Ratio = Population0-4/Populationfemale, 50-64 
Note:  A ratio of this sort is, of course, affected both by trends in the numerator and 
the denominator 
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Table 10: Percent of population urban, selected countries, 1950, 1970, 1990 
 
 1950  1970  1990 




    
 Australia  75  85  85 
 Canada  61  76  77 
 Ireland  41  52  57 
 New  Zealand  73  81  85 
 United  Kingdom  84  89  89 
 United  States  64  74  75 
 
CONTINENTAL 68  77  81 
 Belgium  92  94  97 
 France  56  71  74 
 Germany  72  80  85 
 Netherlands  83  86  89 
 
NORDIC 73  80  84 
 Denmark  68  80  85 
 Finland  32  50  61 
 Norway  50  65  72 
 Sweden  66  81  83 
 
S.EUROPE 44  57  64 
 Greece  37  53  59 
 Italy  54  64  67 
 Spain  52  66  75 
JAPAN 50  71  77 
 
Source: United Nations (2001): Table A.2 
MDC = More developed countries  
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Figure 1:  Force of reproduction 1990s, early, middle and late parts of reproductive 







Figure 2:  Schematic diagrams of four different patterns of reproduction 
 










































Appendix:  Total Fertility Rates 
 
 1955-60  1965-
70 
1975-
80  1985-90  1995-
00 
Country(ies) 
ENGLISH SPEAKING   
   
 
 Australia  3.41  2.87  2.09  1.87  1.77 
 Canada  3.90  2.51  1.74  1.62  1.60 
 Ireland  3.68  3.87  3.48  2.29  1.92 
 New  Zealand  4.07  3.35  2.18  2.05  1.97 
 United  Kingdom  2.49  2.52  1.72  1.81  1.70 
  United States of America  3.71  2.55  1.79  1.92  2.04 
CONTINENTAL         
 Austria  2.52  2.53  1.64  1.45  1.36 
 Belgium  2.50  2.34  1.70  1.56  1.55 
 France  2.71  2.61  1.86  1.81  1.73 
 Germany  2.30  2.32  1.52  1.43  1.33 
 Netherlands  3.10  2.80  1.60  1.56  1.54 
JAPAN 2.08  2.00  1.81  1.66  1.41 
NORDIC         
 Denmark  2.54  2.25  1.68  1.54  1.74 
 Norway  2.84  2.72  1.81  1.80  1.83 
 Sweden  2.23  2.16  1.66  1.91  1.51 
SOUTHERN  EUROPE         
 Italy  2.35  2.49  1.89  1.35  1.20 
 Spain  2.75  2.92  2.57  1.48  1.16 
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